Winds of Tehran, Part II

Riot police on patrol in Tehran on June 15 (Faramarz)

Surveying the dizzying, thrilling events and interpretations of those events in Iran, a few thoughts come to mind:

1. By announcing a partial recount of the ballots, the regime is giving ground. At the same time, of course, they have their security forces in the streets and it appears that people are dying, and could well die in far greater numbers in the coming days (which would add its own momentum to this thing). But the regime, on the vote counting issue, has buckled. In and of itself, it’s not going to change much, given the way this thing is growing and given that some flanks of the opposition now seem to have their own demands. I cannot imagine that they would overturn the results. Maybe bring it closer, but not overturn it. As a precedent, however, this seems to me to be an enormous event. “Hey,” I’d be thinking were I in the opposition, “we’ve now accomplished something, something very tangible, beyond getting all those bodies in the streets. If we keep going, we can do more.” Especially if other elements in the regime, namely the security forces, provoke greater outrage by spilling more blood.

2. Obama’s reaction is, to my mind, just fine at this point. I’d expect something else today–I don’t really know why, I just do–but he already sent messages to the Iranian people in past speeches. They should know where he is, and what he thinks of them, and if those words were not playing at least some small part in the creation of the confidence and daring that made this all possible, I’d be very surprised. Incidentally, I’d also be very surprised if some of the money the Bush people, and, I’d guess, the Obama people, have funneled to pro-democracy/anti-regime elements in Iran wasn’t being cashed in to print those signs/spread the word about Twitter and other modes of communication/mobilize support and so on. In the main, though, no over cheerleading right now has made it harder for Iran’s rulers to say this is all coming from the outside, that the country reliably known as the Great Satan, rather than their own sons and daughters, their own young people–that huge chunk of the Iranian population–is at work. An Iranian young person might be forgiven, nowadays–with Obama in office, with at least lip service being given to freezing settlements in the West Bank, with a man who can convincingly say he respects the culture and traditions of Persia and Islam–from thinking that this is not your revolutionary father’s Great Satan.

3. The meta-narrative concerning the coverage of this is remarkable, the twitters and whatnot, along with, it should be said, some sterling accounts from more traditional sources. I don’t really want to get into it, other than to highlight this report, from Robert Fisk, and this indispensable piece of analysis and context from Laura Secor.

4. As for what happens next, the answer is three. Just kidding. I have no idea what will happen. But I do think that the effort to ride these waves has been crucial, on both sides–there are probably more than two sides here, but I’ll say “both” for simplicity’s sake–and how they manage it from here on out will determine the course eventst take. What if the regime had let the protests happen and offered to meet with Mousavi–himself a member of the ruling elite, it should be remembered, before this elevated him into some kind of freedom fighter–and maybe some student leaders? What if they had let the people blow off steam, keeping the security forces in front of critical buildings but otherwise keeping them invisible? To my reading, the regime is doing a great job in keeping this going, in giving the demonstrators reason for both hope and outrage. That points to part of the inherent weakness of such a top-heavy authority structure: A regime that is primarily focused with keeping itself in power can go very, very wrong in situations like this. If they are not ready to go the full-Tienanmen, the full-Rangoon ‘88, and really let it be known that they will shoot to kill and that they’re ready and willing to keep the boot on the throat of the people in the months and years that follow, they have to be especially dexterous if they want to maintain the same amount and same brand of authority. The Ayatollahs, so far, are not proving adept at this, and could well pay a heavy price. A revolution? I’m not sure about that. A sea change? A change of tone in public debate? An expansion of the public square, so to speak? That seems like its already happening.

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Like this post on the Iranian election aftermath? Check out these other posts from True/Slant contributors:

Jonathan Curiel: In droves, Iran’s women have come out of their political closet
Mark Drapeau: How the Iranian Elections Turned “CNN Fail” Into a Media Success
Joshua Kucera: What if Twitter is leading us all astray in Iran?
Ethan Porter: Obama engages by not engaging
Marc Herman: How Iran ‘Jams’ Election News
Kate Klonick: This is no green revolution
Ryan Sager: Iran: Knowing Nothing