“The big problem in these studies is identifying whether the participants understand or care about the difference between morals and desires.”

I don’t see the “big problem”. We often desire immoral things. The eventual behaviors and choices are what phychologists and ethicists study. Certainly there are some scientists concerned with internal states of the brain, such as the amygdala vs. the cortex, but that’s not what we’re discussing here. Further, I didn’t talk about “studies”, per se. Dennett has a conjecture, which may or may not be supported by evidence, that most religious people make a conscious choice about what to believe and integrate into their own moral and behavioral code, and what not. Although I haven’t done a formal study, I am exceedingly confident that any non-literalist, non-fundamentalist religous believer will agree that there are scriptures and strictures they have decieded are not relevant or reasonable.

You say:
“The problem Dennett points out and you affirm is just as simply explained by a compatition between the will of a divine creator and the will of an individual creature.”

You make an extraordinary claim, bringing a whole new actor (and a super-powerful one at that) into a scenario that can be completely explained by individual moral choice. The burden is on you to show what effect necessitates such an astonishing cause. You might as well say that gravity can be as easilly explained by supposing a god pushes the apple down to the Earth. That’s an intriguing conjecture – but to be shown valid it must be supported with proof. No behavior of the fall of an apple, nor the moral choice of an individual requires an appeal to an external divine agency.

You say:
“Thus, we illustrate a huge problem with neodarwinism, the idea that everything we observe is a result of random variation and natural selection.”

Chris, your conclusion does not follow your premise. In a moment of weakness you’ve fallen prey to a classic error in logic and rhetoric. Nowhere do you talk about neodarwinism, natural selection or variation, yet you lay claim to having shown problems with them.

This logical error notwithstanding, natural selection, sexual selection and random genetic mutation – given billions of years and millions or billions of generations, can give rise to beings well-suited to their environment. Such environments also include other plants and animals, and (this is key), other people working and living in a social context. It does not take a leap of faith to perceive the benefits to the community and individual of in-groups, mutual respect, aversion to murder, altruism etc. arising from the need to cooperate to survive. Read “The Science of Good and Evil” by Dr. Shermer for a more extensive treatment of such topics.

You say:
“If you propose that all behaviors are a result of of chance and fitness for survival, every explanation as to why we behave the way we do is reduced to “it just worked for the given circumstances”. And, as an extension, you cannot make any lasting conclusions about how we should behave, because all behaviors are not just influenced, but controlled by context, which is constantly changing.”

There are many remnants of our hunter-gatherer heritage that have negative consequences on our health and socialization in the contemporary world: In-groups and out-groups can lead to prejudice and racism. An historic scarcity of calories leads to appetites primed for overeating. Sexual appetites for the young and strong lead to frequent disregard for the contents of hearts and minds (read “Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors” by Sagan and Druyan), while differences between male and female reproductive investment can help explain infideltity.

The list could go on about how we inherit the predilictions of our ancestors but apply them to an altogether more alien world. Insofar as humanity has created moral strictures to try and keep the primitive brain and ancestral behavioral patterns from negatively impacting our health and the well-being of strangers, it has been a necessary development for civilization.

Our genes have partially “stacked the deck” against us, but our reason and forebearance can overcome much and adapt to an ever-changing world. Religious doctrine, though in practice quite variable and radically recast over time, at any given time purports to have “THE” answer and “THE” moral code. As you so rightly point out, any schema of behavior that is unable to adapt to a changing world, either through unconscious natural selection, or intentional evaluation, is extremely dangerous. Hence the original conclusion Shermer, Dennett and so many others make that inflexible religion is far more dangerous than a more rational, context-aware and compassionate code of ethics.

Thus, we illustrate a huge problem with neodarwinism, the idea that everything we observe is a result of random variation and natural selection.

If you propose that all behaviors are a result of of chance and fitness for survival, every explanation as to why we behave the way we do is reduced to “it just worked for the given circumstances”. And, as an extension, you cannot make any lasting conclusions about how we should behave, because all behaviors are not just influenced, but controlled by context, which is constantly changing.

In the interview Dennett points out the almost universal observational fact that human beings use their innate moral sense to filter, choose and interpret religious edicts, even to the point of discarding some strictures while adding others. This is the direct antithesis of the way some people believe moral religiosity works, whereby people supposedly obtain a moral sense FROM religion.

Even more profoundly, it is just those individuals who insist on a strict interpretation (or literal reading) of religious doctrine rather than relying on a more humane and innate sense of morality (such as expounded in Shermer’s “The Science of Good and Evil”), who we view as dangerous religious zealots.

In short, the human moral compass derived from socialization and evolution variously supports, supersedes or quite often contradicts the strictures of religion. Those who fail to apply such a compass are considered some of the most dangerous and immoral people in the world.

But then the rest of the article talks about the problems of using ancient ethical/moral systems, and merely suggests that we need a modern system that fits the needs of a modern world.

I don’t disagree with any of that, but I think you’ve failed to propose any actual source of moral authority. You do *suggest* that the source is reason, but only defend that by pointing out the flaws in religious morality. I have to say I’m kind of disappointed.