I was going to do a number-filled post incorporating all of the latest demographic data from GosKomStat, data that show that Russia’s demographics continue their slow but steady improvement, but then I saw that Anatoly Karlin had already produced a quality overview of the recent trends. However since Russian health and demographics are my speciality (or at least the area in which I embarrass myself the least) I still want to write something, because I think it’s an issue that is worth highlighting and an area in which Western forecasters have been almost uniformly awful.
To simplify things just a little bit, and really just by a little, the basic Western view of Russia is the following: things are really awful, things are not only really awful but they are clearly getting worse, and not only are things really awful and clearly getting wore but they cannot get better due to the Kremlin’s malevolent incompetence . The people expressing this decidedly pessimistic view of Russia, like any large group of people, run the gamut from the hackish, incompetent, and predictably idiotic (like Ed Lucas) to the honest, intelligent, and highly capable (like fellow True/Slant contributor Julia Ioffe).
Now the world is a very strange and unpredictable place, and it is perfectly possible that the “Russophobe” (a term I hate, as I generally find such labels worthless, but use here for convenience and clarity’s sake) view is the more accurate one. As is probably clear, I don’t have access to any special trove of knowledge, nor do I have a direct line to the powers-that-be in the Kremlin, so I can never state, and hope I’ve never stated, that I am 100% sure that Russia will do X, Y, or Z. I do my best to read a wide variety of sources to understand what’s happening, and I hope that my record as a prognosticator demonstrates that I have some idea what I’m talking about, but Russia is a very big and a very complicated place that has a nasty habit of routinely humbling the Westerners who study it.
All of this is an extremely long-winded and pretentious way of saying that, while I am mildly optimistic about Russia, I don’t want to understate the problems that still plague it: they are legion, and many are serious. The recent spate of violence in the North Caucasus is particularly alarming, and should be keeping even the most supremely confident siloviks up at night. The Putin-Medvedev government has built a great deal of its popularity on the idea (which, as it turns out, is not entirely fanciful) that it has “kept Russians safe,” and a spate of Islamist violence that shows that this is not the case could have potentially catastrophic destabilizing consequences.
Why, then, am I mildly optimistic about Russia, a country that even in the most optimistic of all readings has so many pressing issues? Is it simply because I’m a paid shill? There are two reasons, both of which are quite simple. First, the Russian themselves are increasingly optimistic about the future since they are having more babies, getting married more frequently, getting divorced less frequently, living longer, having fewer accidents, drinking themselves to death less often, and killing themselves (and each other) less and less frequently. Decreases in crime and suicide, and increases in fertility, marriage, and life expectancy, of the sort seen in Russia since 2000, and particularly since 2004, are exactly what one would expect from a society that is increasingly self-confident and making modest economic and social progress.*
Second, and this might even be more important than the first reason, things got so catastrophically awful, so incomprehensibly wretched, gruesome, and horrific during the 1990’s that, absent a descent into a truly Hobbesian state, there was little way to go but up. Most Westerners still don’t comprehend the extent to which Russia collapsed along with Communism, because contemplating things like societal collapses is as difficult as it is disconcerting. I have neither the time nor the rhetorical talent to do a full and comprehensive evaluation of the 1990’s, I’ve made a few crude attempts at various points while writing this blog, but the corruption, the thievery, the violence, the criminality, and the sheer amount of human misery in 1990s Russia make Putin’s version look like the Netherlands. Entire branches of industry, worth billions upon billions of dollars even by the most pessimistic reckonings, were simply handed over in rigged auctions or “purchased” by oligarchs with loans given to them by the state. Assets were stripped and sold off on a historically unprecedented rate, and the amount of capital flight was beyond anyone’s reckoning (some of this money is still tickling back in via Cyprus, which despite its miniscule population and economy is one of the largest sources of Russian ”FDI”). Perhaps most shockingly of all, Russia fought and lost a major war on its own territory.
More telling than any of the political, military, or economic problems (which were very serious indeed) though was the simple fact that Russians abruptly stopped having kids once the Soviet Union fell apart: in the few years after 1991 the fertility rate fell by 50% which is one of the most precipitous drops ever recorded. A more damning indictment of the state of the contry can hardly be imagined. Indeed the fertility rate stayed firmly planted down in the 1.2 range for most of the 1990’s and the first years of Putin’s reign until it started to increase significantly in 2006 (estimates are that it will be right around 1.6 for 2010, which is actually higher than the rate in most Central/East European countries).
The most parsimonious explanation for the increase is that, after significant economic growth and a dramatic increase in real wages, Russians were increasingly confident about their own futures and increasingly able to find gainful employment and afford the basic necessities required for raising a family. The fact that the state started dumping money into pro-natal programs probably didn’t hurt, but decisions about if or when to have a child are intensely personal in nature and are only weakly impacted by state policy.
Of course there are other, competing, explanations for the recent increase in Russian fertility such as “it’s all Mooslims!” or “The state is cooking the books!” but these are pretty radical interpretations that would need a mountain of corroborating evidence to be taken seriously.
So what is the point of all of this? Is there one? Surely boosting my own ego is a major consideration, but I am truly exasperated by the Western tendency to conflate Russia’s condition with its trajectory. It is one thing to say “life in Russia sucks!” In general, I’d agree with this point since large sweeping sections of Russia remain desperately poor and ramshackle: you would need to be blissfully ignorant, or extremely stupid, to not notice the huge gaps between Russia’s level of development and the levels of development of leading industrialized nations. It is, however, an extremely different thing to say “things in Russia are getting worse!” This is simply not true, and the Russians themselves are exceedingly well aware of this. If the Russians come accross someone who is telling them that their country is getting worse they will rightfully be suspicious of that persons motives.
So to the 5 people that will read this screen/paen please: when describing Russia please try to do justice to the fact that things are getting better, and that the most basic indicators of the health of a society (life expectancy, the crime rate, average wages) are far more positive than they have been in many years.
*As Anatoly Karlin astutely noted in his post, Russia’s rates of “death from vice” (alcohol poisoning, suicide, and homicide) are now better than they were in 1990, meaning that one can make a compelling argument that Russians have never lived in a more stable and healthy society. Of course this says more about the deep dysfunctions and pathologies that have long been charicteristic of Russia than it does the blissful nature of Medvedev’s kingdom circa 2010