David Plouffe’s memoir: Some highlights

On Tuesday, Viking Adult will release The Audacity to Win: The Inside Story and Lessons of Barack Obama’s Historic Victory, David Plouffe’s memoir about the 2008 presidential campaign. Time has published an excerpt of the book, which comes out exactly a year after Obama’s election.

Below, a few intriguing tidbits about Reverend Wright, Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden, and Sarah Palin, straight from the Obama campaign strategist’s page:

On the Reverend Wright speech:

Obama had raised giving a race speech back in the fall. At the time, [chief strategist David] Axelrod and I strenuously disagreed, believing that we should not inject into the campaign an issue that for the most part was not on voters’ minds. Now we were in a much different situation. I agreed that a traditional political move — the damage-control interviews we had done that night — would not be enough. But a speech was fraught with peril. If it was off-key, it could compound our problems.

… [Obama said,] “I think I need to do, so I’ll need an awfully compelling argument not to give this speech. … I already know what I want to say in this speech. I’ve been thinking about it for almost 30 years.”

On Hillary for VP:

What surprised me … was that Obama was clearly thinking more seriously about picking Hillary Clinton than [David Axelrod] and I had realized. He said if his central criterion measured who could be the best VP, she had to be included in that list. She was competent, could help in Congress, would have international bona fides and had been through this before, albeit in a different role.

… Barack continued to be intrigued by Hillary. “I still think Hillary has a lot of what I am looking for in a VP,” he said to us. “Smarts, discipline, steadfastness. I think Bill may be too big a complication. If I picked her, my concern is that there would be more than two of us in the relationship.”

On meeting with Joe Biden:

The [first] meeting started with Biden launching into a nearly 20-minute monologue that ranged from the strength of our campaign in Iowa (“I literally wouldn’t have run if I knew the steamroller you guys would put together”); to his evolving views of Obama (“I wasn’t sure about him in the beginning of the campaign, but I am now”); why he didn’t want to be VP (“The last thing I should do is VP; after 36 years of being the top dog, it will be hard to be No. 2″); why he was a good choice (“But I would be a good soldier and could provide real value, domestically and internationally”); and everything else under the sun. [Axelrod] and I couldn’t get a word in edgewise.

It confirmed what we suspected: this dog could not be taught new tricks. But the conversation also confirmed our positive assumptions: his firm grasp of issues, his blue collar sensibilities and the fact that while he would readily accept the VP slot if offered, he was not pining for it.

On interviewing Senator Evan Bayh for the VP slot:

Bayh’s answers to our questions were substantively close to perfect, if cautiously so. Seeing Bayh right after Biden provided some interesting contrasts and comparisons. Listening to Bayh talk, I thought, There’s no way this guy will color outside the lines. Biden may cross them with too much frequency. Biden will probably end up having more range — he can reach higher heights but could cause us real pain.

On picking Biden:

“My sense is — and you tell me if the research backs this up — that Barack Hussein Obama is change enough for people. I don’t have to convince people with my VP selection that I am serious about change,” [said Obama]

On McCain picking Sarah Palin:

We always knew this day was going to be a pain in the ass. … But [Sarah] Palin was a bolt of lightning, a true surprise. She was such a long shot, I didn’t even have her research file on my computer … I started Googling her, refreshing my memory while I waited for our research to be sent.

On responding to the Palin pick:

We decided to call McCain on the experience card directly. …

Our statement immediately received an enormous amount of attention because it went right at her experience. … Seeing the reaction, I began to think perhaps we had misfired. Obama clearly thought so. … “I understand the argument you guys were trying to make. And maybe we should make it someday. But not today. We shouldn’t have put out the first part of that statement. I want to put out another statement that simply welcomes her to the race, and I’ll call her and congratulate her …” 

I didn’t disagree but thought backtracking would only add to the sense in the press that perhaps Palin was a brilliant game-changing pick that had scrambled the race. … “Look,” I told him, “simply say that you’re adding your own personal voice, one principal to another.” He acknowledged that he understood and would watch his words. “We’ll send out a personal statement from you and Biden,” I said, “but it’s important you not suggest we misfired on the original statement. Don’t throw the campaign under the bus.”

But when he took a few questions from the press later that day, he proceeded to drive the bus right over us. “I think that, you know, campaigns start getting these hair triggers, and the statement that Joe and I put out reflects our sentiments,” he said. Great, I thought, already imagining the heat we’d take on this.