I not believe that simply buying off insurgents per se is a solution all by itself. In Iraq, it worked for the Sunni based Insurgents because it suited other of their goals, which was to defeat al-Qaeda in Iraq and to arm themselves for conflict with the Shia based armed forces, both in and out of the government. In the absence of those two other forces, it is doubtful that the Sunni based insurgents would have taken the money.

However it could be a useful part of a broader strategy. The Obama Administration and the MSM generally describe the insurgents in Afghanistan as “Taliban” and al-Qaeda, as if these groups were a single coherent military organization like their NATO enemies. The majority of the insurgents in Afghanistan are tribal militia members who have only passing affinity for the Taliban or al-Qaeda. Their primary alliance is to the feudal clan and tribal leaders who are funded by the opium trade. Our current strategy is to driven these three forces together and destroy all three together. This does not seem to be working.

An alternative strategy would be divide these three allies. Legalizing (or at least perhaps a “don’t ask, don’t tell” approach) to opium farming and trading, as well as pulling NATO troops out of the regions of where the Pushtun speaking warlords hold sway. This, combined with a some sort of financial incentives, could pull the majority of the insurgency out of combat. Combined with some sort of negotiated settlement and power sharing with the Taliban proper and these Pushtun drug lords might isolate al-Qaeda and allow for its destruction.

However, this is no easy strategy. First there are the non-Pushtun regions which are not tied to the opium business nor to the Taliban. They cannot be left out of the picture. Then there is Kabul and the “national” government based there. There has to be some sort of central government our we might end up with Somalia-stan.

So by itself, your proposal is unrealistic. However as part of some broader effort, it could be a key component.